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Summary
This report describes safeguards implementation in Finland in 2004. The report covers 
the legal basis  for safeguards, activities of license holders, the inventories of the nuclear 
materials, the inspections performed by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
IAEA, and the European Union, the implementation of the Additional Protocol and ﬁnally, 
the statement of the Finnish nuclear safeguards during the year 2004.
KARILA Kauko (ed.). Nucler Safeguards in Finland 2004. STUK-B-YTO 238. Helsinki 2005.  
26 pp. + Annexes 2 pp.
Keywords: non-proliferation, nuclear materials, safeguards, illicit trafﬁcking, nuclear smuggling, 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT)
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The peaceful use of nuclear materials has to be 
guaranteed by the most credible way. The national 
nuclear safeguards system has been established for 
this purpose: to ensure that the nuclear materials, 
equipment and technology are used only for the de-
clared, peaceful purposes. The national safeguards 
system cooperates with the Euratom safeguards 
system and with the IAEA.
The Finnish safeguards system comprises the 
authorities and licence holders. Functioning of the 
national system is subject to international control. 
Undistributed responsibility on safety, security 
and safeguarding of its nuclear materials is on the 
1 Introduction
licence holder. It is the responsibility of the com-
petent state authority to ensure that the licence 
holders comply with the requirements of the safe-
guards agreement.
Nuclear materials safeguards apply to:
• nuclear materials (special ﬁssionable material 
and source material)
• other nuclear items (components, equipment, 
materials suitable for producing nuclear energy 
or for nuclear weapons, agreements and tech-
nology)
• licence holders’ activities, expertise, prepared-
ness and competence.
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2 Finnish national safeguards system
2.1 Legal basis
The basis of the national safeguards is comprised 
of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree. By 
virtue of the Act STUK issues detailed regulations 
(YVL Guides) that apply to the safe use of nuclear 
energy. The main guides related to safeguards are:
• Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (Guide YVL 6.1)
• The national system of accounting for and con-
trol of nuclear materials (Guide YVL 6.9)
• Reports to be submitted on nuclear materials 
(Guide YVL 6.10).
Finland was the ﬁrst state where the INFCIRC/153-
type safeguards agreement with the IAEA entered 
into force (INFCIRC/155, February 9, 1972). This 
agreement was suspended after Finland joined to 
the European Union and the agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon States of the EU, the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in 
Finland on October 1, 1995.
The national safeguards system was main-
tained after Finland joined the EU and to the 
Euratom safeguards system on January 1, 1995. 
The basic motivation for maintaining the national 
system has to do with the responsibilities assumed 
by the state following the NPT. The Euratom safe-
guards is based on the Euratom Treaty and the 
Commission Regulation No. 3227/76, as amended. 
The Finnish facilities and STUK have been prepar-
ing the implementation of the New Commission 
Regulation (No 302/2005) which came into force in 
the ﬁrst half of 2005.
Finland signed the Additional Protocol in 
Vienna, 22 September 1998, with the other EU 
member states and ratiﬁed it in August 2000. The 
AP entered into force in April 30, 2004 after all the 
EU countries ratiﬁed it.
Finland has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon 
joining to the EU, the agreements with Australia, 
Canada and the USA were partly substituted by 
the Euratom agreements with these states. Also the 
agreements with Sweden and the UK have partly 
been expired. The old agreement made with the 
Soviet Union was continued for ﬁve years in 1999 
and the negotiations with the Russian Federation 
about new agreement are now underway.
2.2 Parties of the Finnish 
safeguards system
2.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for non-proliferation policy and the international 
agreements. The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
is responsible for highest management and control 
of nuclear energy in Finland. It is responsible for 
legislation related to nuclear energy and it is also 
the competent safeguards authority mentioned in 
the Euratom Treaty. Also other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Defence are contributing to the efﬁcient function of 
the national safeguards system.
2.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible to maintain the national safeguards 
system in order to prevent the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons. It regulates the license holders’ ac-
tivities and ensures that the obligations of inter-
national agreements concerning peaceful use of 
nuclear materials are met. Regulatory control of 
STUK is directed at the possession, manufacture, 
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production, transfer, handling, use, storage, trans-
port, export and import of nuclear material and 
other nuclear items.
STUK takes care of the approval of the IAEA 
and the consultation of Commission inspectors 
for Finland. STUK shall approve an inspector if 
his activities are not considered to endanger the 
safe use of nuclear energy or the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. If STUK can not 
approve an inspector, it shall assign the approval 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The safeguards implementation by STUK cov-
ers all the typical measures of the State System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(SSAC). In addition, STUK has its own independ-
ent audit and veriﬁcation programme particularly 
for the spent nuclear fuel to ensure the complete-
ness and correctness of the operator data. The safe-
guards implementation in national level is closely 
linked with other functions like export/import con-
trol, customs and border control, transport safety, 
preventing of illicit trafﬁcking, physical protec-
tion and certain measures of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The transportation of nuclear and other radio-
active materials are very closely linked to the safe-
guards objectives. In Finland, STUK’s safeguards 
section is responsible to regulate the radioactive 
material transportations and acceptance of the 
transport packages. Finland, being the eastern 
border of the EU, has an important role taking care 
of the prevention of illicit trafﬁcking of nuclear ma-
terials. STUK cooperates closely with the Finnish 
Customs and offers its expertise to develop the 
monitoring of radioactive materials on the borders, 
and also to train the Custom ofﬁcers.
At STUK, the safeguards section is a part 
of the Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation 
Department, with 21 staff members. See organiza-
tion chart, Fig. 1. The duties of the department are 
the following: nuclear waste management, national 
data centre for the CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty) and nuclear materials regula-
tion including transportation of radioactive mate-
rials. The director of the department is Mrs Arja 
Tanninen. She has an administrative staff dealing 
with safeguards. Mr Juha Rautjärvi is a coordina-
tor of the co-operation programme for the Russian 
Federation. He is also contributing to the non-pro-
liferation issues. Mrs Erja Kainulainen is the coor-
dinator of the Finnish Support Programme to the 
IAEA safeguards and is responsible for licensing of 
nuclear materials and other nuclear goods.
Director General
Jukka Laaksonen
Nuclear Waste and Materials 
Regulation
Directors
Public 
Information
Emergency 
Preparedness
Expert Services
Non-Ionising Radiation 
Surveillance
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Radiation Practices Regulation
Research and Environmental 
Surveillance
Director
ArjaTanninen
Management Support
Regulation of Nuclear Waste
Regulation of Nuclear Materials
Section Head 
National Data Centre for 
Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)
Elina Martikka
Administration and Internal Services
Figure 1. The organization of STUK.
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Six experts (one of them part-time) are working in 
the nuclear materials section:
• Mrs Elina Martikka, Section Head (national 
system, Additional Protocol (AP) implementa-
tion)
Figure 2. Staff of Nuclear Materials Section 2004.
• Mr Tapani Honkamaa, Senior Inspector (Non-
Destructive Analysis (NDA), ﬁnal disposal)
• Mr Marko Hämäläinen, Inspector (inspections, 
AP implementation)
• Mr Kauko Karila, Inspector (reporting, docu-
mentation)
• Mr Olli Okko, Senior Inspector (research and 
development (R&D), ﬁnal disposal)
• Mr Jaakko Tikkinen, Senior Inspector (trans-
portation, illicit trafﬁcking).
2.2.3 Operators
The last but not the least parties in the safeguards 
system are the operators. The operators have the 
core of the State’s safeguards system concerning 
the facility level nuclear material accountancy and 
control with the authentic source data of the nu-
clear materials. The operators have to prepare the 
Nuclear Material Handbooks covering all the infor-
mation how the safeguards in that individual facil-
ity is carried out. The Handbook, which is also the 
part of the quality system, is approved by STUK.
STUK-B-YTO 238
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3 Themes of the year
It seems that the Additional Protocol and the 
Safeguards for Final Disposal have been the major 
challenges during the year 2004, that the themes 
of the year 2004 are the same than during the year 
2003. But very many steps have been taken during 
the year 2004.
3.1 The Additional Protocol (AP)
The AP entered into force on 30 April, 2004. 
The extended work of updating the Commission 
Safeguards Regulation, which gives the legal ba-
sis for the Commission to carry out its responsi-
bilities deﬁned in the AP, has been ﬁnished in the 
Atomic Questions Group (AQG) in March, 2004. 
STUK has actively taken part to the experts meet-
ing dealing with the AP – the AQG, the IAEA tech-
nical meetings and the Commission (DG TREN 
– Directorates H and I) meetings organised for the 
Member States.
In March STUK negotiated with the IAEA 
about the practical implementation of the AP. In 
April STUK visited in Luxembourg to discuss with 
the Commission about the implementation prac-
tises. The amendments for the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy legislation entered into force on May, 2004. 
Finland provided the declarations to the IAEA on 
July 8, 2004. The ﬁrst complementary access was 
carried out in Helsinki University, Radiochemical 
Laboratory on December 21, 2004.
3.2 Safeguards for ﬁnal disposal
Finland has decided that all spent nuclear fuel pro-
duced in Finnish power plants will be disposed in 
the Finnish bedrock. After careful studies, Olkiluoto 
in the Eurajoki municipality was chosen to be the 
location for ﬁnal geological repository of spent nu-
clear fuel. The implementing nuclear waste com-
pany, Posiva Oy, will perform all necessary tasks 
and activities to ensure the safe construction of 
the repository at this location in Olkiluoto. It is 
very important to determine the requirements of 
the safeguards in time – including also the inter-
national (IAEA and EU) requirements. In sum-
mer 2004, the ﬁrst concrete step in the Finnish 
ﬁnal repository was taken as the excavation of 
the research and development tunnel, ONKALO 
begun. The ONKALO most probably will be a part 
of the ﬁnal repository in the future. In order to 
facilitate the IAEA’s State level analysis about the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities, the imple-
menting company was obligated to produce timely 
safeguards-relevant documents covering the whole 
lifetime of the repository.
10
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4 Safeguards implementation
Most of the nuclear material in Finland (see Fig.3 
and 4) is used as a fuel for the Finnish nuclear 
power plants (NPPs). The main areas relevant to 
the nuclear materials safeguards during 2004 were 
the supply of the nuclear fuel, import, transpor-
tation, storing, handling and use of it. The deci-
sion to build the ﬁfth Finnish power reactor in the 
Olkiluoto NPP area, beginning in 2005, has also 
been taken into account in the plans of the next 
year’s safeguards activities.
Figure 3. Uranium amount in Finnish nuclear power plants in 1990–2004.
Figure 4. Plutonium amount in Finnish nuclear power plants in 1990–2004.
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Table I. Summary of nuclear materials receipts and shipments in 2004.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Germany 114 19 763 –
W0L1 Spain 8 1 415 –
W0L2 Sweden 100 16 916 –
W0LS W0L1 164 27 121 241
W0LS W0L2 246 41 895 380
WL0V Russia 126 15 120 –
Spain 108 13 561 –
 W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = Low-enriched uranium
4.1 The Loviisa NPP
Fortum is one of the biggest energy companies 
in Scandinavia. In the past, Fortum was a state-
owned company formed from Imatran Voima and 
Neste. Fortum has electric power plants of many 
types: nuclear, gas, coal, oil, among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat is located in Loviisa in eastern Finland, 
where there are two nuclear power reactor units 
with common spent fuel storages (material balance 
area WL0V). The electricity generated in Loviisa 
NPP – ca. 10% of the whole electricity production 
in Finland – is used as a primal supply source in 
Finnish electrical network.
Fortum has earlier purchased the fuel for reac-
tor units Loviisa 1 and 2 mainly from the Russian 
Federation as complete assemblies. Nowadays 
about half of the fuel assemblies are imported from 
the Russian Federation and the remaining half 
from Spain. The most of uranium is of Russian ori-
gin. Until 1996 the spent fuel was returned back to 
the Russian Federation. Due to the change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation the spent fuel has been 
stored in the interim storage since 1996.
In 2004, STUK granted Fortum two import li-
cences concerning the fresh fuel from Spain. Based 
on granted licences totally 234 fuel assemblies 
containing 28.7 tons of uranium was imported to 
Loviisa NPP: 126 fuel assemblies (average ura-
nium enrichment 4%) from the Russian Federation 
and 108 fuel assemblies (3.7%) from Spain. The 
receipts of fuel assemblies are stated in Table I.
Loviisa 1 refuelling and maintaining outage was 
performed in July 24 – September 9, 2004 and for 
Loviisa 2 in September 4–26, 2004. In Loviisa 1 re-
fuelling, 102 fresh fuel assemblies were loaded into 
the core, whereas in Loviisa 2 refuelling, 96 fresh 
fuel assemblies and 6 earlier discharged spent fuel 
assemblies were loaded into the core. Before clos-
ing of each of the reactors STUK, the IAEA and the 
Commission identiﬁed the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and veriﬁed the fuel assemblies in 
loading ponds. Loviisa 1 was inspected on August 
25–26, 2004 and Loviisa 2 on September 11, 2004. 
Four routine inspections were performed together 
with the IAEA and the Commission in March, 
June, September and December. In addition, dur-
ing the inspection in September 2004, the IAEA 
and the Commission also measured fuel elements 
in Loviisa reactor 1 hall. STUK’s measurements in 
Loviisa are reported in Chapter 4.8.
Fortum reported to STUK about its interna-
tional uranium transfers. On the basis of its veri-
ﬁcation and assessment, STUK has concluded that 
Fortum has complied with its safeguards obliga-
tions.
4.2 The Olkiluoto NPP
Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) is a private company 
owned by Finnish industrial and power companies 
to whom it provides electricity at cost price. TVO 
owns and operates two nuclear power plant units 
and a interim spent fuel storage in Olkiluoto, in 
the municipality of Eurajoki on the west coast of 
Finland. Olkiluoto NPP produces ca. 16% of whole 
electricity production in Finland. In Olkiluoto there 
are three material balance areas (W0L1, W0L2 and 
W0LS).
TVO uses uranium of Australian, Canadian, 
Russian and Chinese origin. Uranium is enriched 
in the Russian Federation or in the EU. The fuel 
assemblies are manufactured in Germany, Spain 
and Sweden.
In 2004, STUK granted to TVO two import 
12
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licences for nuclear fuel. Totally 222 fuel assem-
blies containing 38.1 tons of uranium (3.5%) was 
imported to Olkiluoto NPP, 114 fuel assemblies 
from Germany, 8 from Spain and 100 from Sweden. 
The receipts and shipments of fuel assemblies are 
stated in Table II. STUK also granted to TVO one 
import license for control rods and one import li-
cense for two steam driers.
Olkiluoto 1 refuelling and maintaining out-
age was performed in May 9 – May 25, 2004 
and Olkiluoto 2 in May 25 – June 3, 2004. In 
Olkiluoto 1 refuelling, 134 fresh fuel assemblies 
and in Olkiluoto 2 refuelling, 128 fresh fuel as-
semblies were loaded into the core. Before each of 
the reactors was closed STUK, the IAEA and the 
Commission identiﬁed the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and veriﬁed the fuel assemblies in 
loading ponds. Olkiluoto 1 was inspected on May 
20–21, 2004 and Olkiluoto 2 on May 31 – June 
1, 2004. STUK, the IAEA and the Commission 
veriﬁed the inventory in Olkiluoto Spent Fuel 
Storage on September 9, 2004. Four routine in-
spections were performed by STUK, the IAEA 
and the Commission (for each MBAs) in Olkiluoto: 
in March, June, September and November 2004. 
STUK’s measurements in Olkiluoto NPP are re-
ported in Chapter 4.8.
TVO reported to STUK about its international 
fuel contracts, fuel transfers and shipments. On 
the basis of its veriﬁcation and assessment, STUK 
has concluded that TVO has complied with its safe-
guards obligations.
4.3 VTT FiR 1 research reactor
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located 
on other facilities than nuclear power plants. The 
most signiﬁcant of those is VTT research reactor 
(MBA WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. STUK, IAEA 
and Commission safeguards inspectors veriﬁed the 
nuclear material inventory of VTT on 23 August, 
2004. The nuclear material inventory was found to 
be correct. The nuclear material accountancy and 
control were acceptably performed by VTT. The 
inventory of nuclear materials in the end of 2004 is 
presented in Table III.
4.4 Minor nuclear material holders
The location outside facilities are STUK (WFRS), 
the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at Helsinki 
University (WHEL) and OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
(WKK0).
STUK’s nuclear activities are mainly storing of 
nuclear materials. STUK has the Central Interim 
Storage for Small-User Radioactive Waste (“Small-
Waste Storage”) located in the NPP waste cave in 
Olkiluoto and the small radionuclide storage at 
STUK.
At moment the Laboratory of Radiochemistry 
of Helsinki University has no nuclear activities 
excluding store of minor amount of nuclear mate-
rial. Anyhow it is possible that they will continue 
the research work with nuclear materials in the 
future.
The only activity of OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
concerning nuclear materials is storing process 
by-products. While obtaining clean cobalt, they 
are getting sodium uranate solution among other 
substances. This sodium uranate solution has been 
timely shipped to Comurhex in France. OMG 
Kokkola Chemicals has an operation license to 
store max 20 000 kg of uranium in this solution.
In the end of 2004, there were ten other nu-
clear material holders, mostly having some minor 
amounts of nuclear materials, mostly exempted 
materials. Almost all of them have nuclear mate-
rials in the form of depleted uranium shieldings. 
Only three holders, Geological Survey of Finland 
(GTK), Metorex International and University of 
Jyväskylä (Department of Physics) have some oth-
er nuclear materials. GTK has ca. 1.17 g of HEU 
to be used as a spike material in geological studies 
and for mass spectrometry calibrations. Metorex 
has ca. 10 g of natural uranium that they use as 
calibration material for radiation monitoring gates. 
University of Jyväskylä (Department of Physics) 
uses small amounts of NM as a material for manu-
facturing targets or sources or directly to be used 
as a targets irradiated with accelerator ion beams 
or as radiation sources in calibration of radiation 
Table II. Fuel assemblies in nuclear power plants on 
December 31, 2004.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
WL0V 3 742/2 965 433 058 3 474
W0L1 1 288/716 217 723 1 042
W0L2 1 060/494 180 974 750
W0LS 4 838/4 838 824 342 6 771
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa 313 FAs and Olkiluoto 500 FAs per reactor)
STUK-B-YTO 238
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detectors for basic research of nuclear structure.
In 2004, all these small nuclear material hold-
ers have re-requested exemption (derogation in 
sense of EU safeguards regulation) from safe-
guards for these materials. A list of minor nuclear 
material holders including close down locations is 
presented in Table IV.
4.5 Other nuclear items
The Finnish Nuclear Energy legislation regulates 
also other nuclear items than nuclear material. 
Possession, transfer, import and export of those 
item requires a licence or at least a notiﬁcation 
to STUK. In 2004, STUK gave a statement to the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry on the license ap-
plication of Sigma Aldrich/YA Kemia to export deu-
terium compounds to Estonia and the Ministry 
granted the license.
4.6 IAEA safeguards
The IAEA safeguards in Finland is based on the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) between the 
non-nuclear weapon states of the EU, the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA. The 
IAEA and Euratom safeguards have agreed on co-
operation (New Partnership Approach, NPA) with 
the aim of reducing the undue duplication of ef-
fort. In Finland this has not decreased the number 
of inspection days. There is still overlap with the 
Commission and IAEA activities. In 2004 the IAEA 
safeguards activities were carried out without sig-
niﬁcant changes compared with the previous year.
The facility attachments (FA) according to the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) were not in 
force in 2004 in Finland. This situation is not ap-
preciated but it has not negatively inﬂuenced the 
implementation.
Table III. Nuclear material amounts in Finland on December 31, 2004.
MBA U-Natural (kg) U-Enriched (kg) U-Depleted (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
WL0V – 433 058 – 3 474 –
W0L1 – 217 723 – a) 1 042 –
W0L2 – 180 974 – 750 –
W0LS – 824 342 – 6 771 –
WRRF 1 510 60.1 0.002 – –
WFRS 44.7 1.4 592.5 0.003 2.5
WKK0 1 687.2 – – – –
WHEL 39 0.3 20 0.003 1.9
Othersb) < 0.1 – 918 < 0.01 –
WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes; WFRS = STUK; WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals; WHEL = Helsinki University’s laboratory of radiochemistry. 
a) TVO has ca. 10.3 kg DU samples for training and exhibition purposes in Olkiluoto. 
b) Others means the small laboratories and minor NM holders listed in Table IV
Table IV. Amounts of nuclear material at minor nuclear material holders.
Company
Nuclear material (kg)
MBA + use of NMU-dep U-nat U-Leu U-Heu Pu Th
Geological Survey of Finland 
(GTK)
– – – 0.00174 – – SF 0293 CA, Minor NM activities
Finnair Engineering 15.5 – – – – – SF 0302 CA, DU radiation shielding
Rautaruukki, Raahe Works 264 – – – – – SF 0303 CA, DU radiation shielding
Inspecta 304 – – – – – SF 0304 CA, DU radiation shielding
Outokumpu Stainless 100.98 – – – – – W0KU, DU radiation shielding
Centre for Technical Training,  
Metal and Machinery
15 – – – – – DU radiation shielding
Polartest 163.2 – – – – – DU radiation shielding
MAP Medical Technologies 55 – – – – – DU radiation shielding
Metorex International – 0.0105 – – – – U-nat standards
14
STUK-B-YTO 238
STUK takes care of the approval of the IAEA 
inspectors for Finland. When received the infor-
mation about the new inspector candidates STUK 
has sent the requests for comments to the largest 
nuclear material holders. Remarks were made on 
two inspector candidates by the two largest nu-
clear material holders. STUK endorsed a document 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry, that did not 
accept the two candidates. In 2004, altogether 40 
new IAEA inspectors were accepted by STUK to in-
spect Finnish nuclear installations. After the entry 
into force of the Additional Protocol 186 inspectors 
from the list of 188 proposed ones were accepted to 
Finland.
STUK has received 21 statements by IAEA con-
cerning the inspections during the year 2004. Eight 
statements of the inspections carried out during 
the year 2004 were not yet received in March 2005. 
There were no remarks about the outstanding 
questions in the statements.
4.7 Euratom safeguards
The Treaty of the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (Euratom Treaty) and the EU Safeguards 
Regulation (3227/76) (amended by Regulation No 
302/2005) based on the Treaty form the founda-
tion for the Euratom safeguards. Nuclear material 
holders and producers of ores that contain ura-
nium or thorium have the responsibility to main-
tain the nuclear material accountancy system and 
Figure 5. Number of inspections carried out by the Commission, IAEA and STUK at Finnish Facilities 1997–2004.
Figure 6. Number of inspection mandays during inspections carried out by the Commission, IAEA and STUK at 
Finnish Facilities 1997–2004.
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submit reports and other data to the Commission 
in Luxembourg. The copies of the reports and other 
data have to be sent to STUK.
Based on Basic Technical Characteristics pro-
vided by the operators the Commission prepares 
particular safeguards provisions (PSPs) for each 
material balance area. For the Loviisa NPP and 
the VTT Research reactor (FiR 1 reactor) the PSPs 
came into force in 1998. The Commission has 
asked for and got the comments on the PSPs from 
STUK and TVO in 2001, but the PSPs concerning 
the Olkiluoto NPP are still under preparation.
STUK takes care of the consulting (Euratom 
Treaty, article 81) of the Commission inspectors for 
Finland. STUK has sent the requests of the new 
Commission safeguards proposed inspector candi-
dates for comments to the largest nuclear material 
holders. No remarks were made. In 2004, altogeth-
er 5 new Commission safeguards inspectors were 
consulted to inspect Finnish nuclear installations. 
There were a total of 190 Commission inspectors 
that had the right of inspection in Finland on 
December 31, 2004.
The IAEA statements was sent to the Com-
mission, and the Commission amended its own con-
clusions to the statements before providing them to 
the State. The conclusions by the Commission were 
in line with the IAEA remarks – there were no out-
standing questions at the end of 2004.
4.8 STUK´s spent fuel veriﬁcations
The measuring systems are the same than in year 
2003. List of the methods is presented in Table V. 
The characteristics of different measuring equip-
ment are described in more detail in various tech-
Table V. STUK’s Non-Destructive Analysis measuring equipment of spent fuel.
Method Characteristics Note
1 GBUV (Gamma Burn-Up 
Veriﬁer)
Portable, relative eff. 20%, HPGe (High Purity 
Germanium detector) placed behind 3 mm slit 
in spent fuel pool.
Only Olkiluoto has slits in the pool walls. 
2 EFORK (enhanced FORK 
detector)
Traditional FORK (Neutron/Gamma Ray 
Veriﬁcation) equipped with 20 mm3 CdZnTe 
spectrometer
Transferable. Can be used in Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa. 
3 Olkiluoto SFAT (Spent Fuel 
Attribute Tester)
Completely underwater (NaI detector inside 
watertight cover). Moving telescope.
Operation with Olkiluoto fuel transfer 
machine.
4 Loviisa SFAT (new storage) Completely underwater (detector inside 
watertight cover). No moving parts inside.
Operation with Loviisa fuel transfer 
machine.
5 Loviisa SFAT (old storage) Pipe and supporting structure. The detector 
can be either 20% HPGe or NaI detector.
Pipe has a holder for separate detector 
above water level. HPGe or NaI detectors 
have been used.
nical reports. An overall view of STUK’s measur-
ing activities can be obtained from the reference 
(Honkamaa T, Hämäläinen M, How STUK veriﬁes 
spent fuel – and why? Proceedings of ESARDA, 25th 
Annual Meeting, Stockholm, May 2003, available 
on CD, ISBN 92-894-5654-X).
The system itself is adequate to run the regular 
measuring programme consisting typically two 
inspections per nuclear power plant per year and 
all types of fuel.
In December 2004 STUK received new gamma 
spectrometric software “Unisampo”, which runs in 
Linux operating system, which was used in Loviisa 
SFAT campaign. The experience was very good, be-
cause the system was very reliable and stable. Also 
the new software is simpler to operate than the 
previous version. However, some essential func-
tions should be added to the software before it fully 
satisﬁes STUK’s needs.
STUK made three measuring campaigns of 
spent nuclear fuel in 2004. The campaigns are list-
ed in Table VI. The table includes also Fork-meas-
urements made in Loviisa 09/2004, which STUK 
also participated and independently analysed the 
results. No anomalies were observed.
Table VI. Spent fuel measurements in Finland in 2004.
Location Date
Measured 
assemblies Method
Olkiluoto KPA 29.6.–1.7. 23 GBUV
VTT with PIV 23.8. 4 IAEA instrument 
Olkiluoto KPA 7.–8.9. 125 SFAT
Loviisa 1 
reactor hall
7.10. 13 FORK  
(IAEA device)
Loviisa KPA 
old storage
14.–16.12. 129 SFAT
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5 Safeguards for ﬁnal disposal 
in geological repository
5.1 Safeguards requirements
The ﬁnal disposal of spent nuclear fuel in the geo-
logical repository at Olkiluoto was accepted by the 
local municipality and the state authorities, and 
was ﬁnally endorsed by the Parliament of Finland 
in 2001. The geological site investigations pro-
ceeded to the underground phase in 2004 when 
the excavation of the tunnel system for bedrock 
characterisation at repository site begun. The ﬁ-
nal disposal facility will consist of the surface in-
stallations including the encapsulation plant and 
the underground galleries. In general, the siting 
of these facilities at the territory of Olkiluoto is 
not yet designed. Moreover, the plan to construct 
an underground rock characterisation facility that 
includes a ramp, a tunnel and a shaft is not subject 
either to the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act or to the 
Commission Safeguards Regulation COM 302/2005 
until it is evident and it has been accepted that 
spent fuel will be moved through these tunnels to 
ﬁnal disposal. Nevertheless, the possibility to have 
this underground space as a licensed part of the 
nuclear repository shall be considered already dur-
ing the construction phase. Referring to the recom-
mendations generated in the IAEA’s Programme 
for Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal 
of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories, the safe-
guards approach in the pre-operational phase at 
Olkiluoto site is requested. At this pre-operational 
phase the main obligation is the veriﬁcation of the 
excavated rock space and its geometrical volume. 
In addition, the international community must be 
ensured about the absence of undeclared nuclear 
or other safeguards relevant activities at or near 
the repository already during the excavation of 
the investigatory galleries. Although the under-
ground rock characterisation facility is declared as 
the States general nuclear fuel cycle related plan 
under the Additional Protocol, STUK has made 
a proposal towards the IAEA to share knowledge 
about the progress at the repository site in order to 
enable the IAEA to fulﬁl its obligations.
Figure 7. The implementing company Posiva is 
presenting its activities at the ONKALO to the IAEA 
delegation.
Figure 8. Underground excavation of the research gal-
leries for ﬁnal disposal of spent nuclear fuel begun in 
2004.
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5.2 National system for ﬁnal disposal
The plans to construct the underground facility 
for the ﬁnal disposal of spent nuclear fuel signify 
that the ﬁrst safeguards measures, e.g. baseline 
mapping of the repository area, needed to be taken 
prior to the excavation phase. In order to sup-
port the development and implementation of the 
regulatory control of the ﬁnal disposal programme, 
STUK established an independent national expert 
group, LOSKA, in April 2002. The group supports 
STUK in the development of the technical safe-
guards requirements, in the implementation of the 
safeguards and in the evaluation of the facility op-
erator plans. The group reviewed the IAEA recom-
mendations for safeguarding a geological reposi-
tory with the focus on the conditions at Olkiluoto. 
In addition, the group collected baseline data for 
safeguards purposes using geophysical, i.e. pas-
sive seismic techniques and satellite imagery dur-
ing 2003.This work continued in 2004 to evalu-
ate the methods for their relevance concerning the 
safeguards. During the construction of the under-
ground galleries, the responsibility to generate the 
safeguards relevant data is at the implementing 
company.
The safeguards meetings between Posiva and 
STUK have been organised regularly. The main 
target was to ﬁnd the most concrete solution for 
the national safeguards measures in case of an 
unusual “facility”. By the end of 2004 STUK de-
ﬁned the requirements of how to implement the 
safeguards in ONKALO, and Posiva provided the 
ﬁrst safeguards reports to STUK.
Also a meeting between IAEA, Posiva and 
STUK was organised. The aim of the national re-
quirements, concerning presently ONKALO and 
later the repository, is to meet and cover all the 
international needs. The drafting of “Safeguards 
Agreement for ONKALO” has been initiated with 
the IAEA.
5.3 International model
Underground facilities for ﬁnal disposal of spent 
create a new challenge to the safeguards society. 
The main concern is that after safe disposal in the 
subsurface, there is still a need to have a credible 
assurance about the absence of safeguards-rele-
vant activities, although the nuclear materials are 
not accessible or reveriﬁable using the traditional 
safeguards technologies. Therefore, new geophysi-
cal methods are supposed to play a remarkable role 
in safeguarding repositories. STUK has evaluated 
these methods site-speciﬁcally for Olkiluoto in co-
operation with the expert’s group supporting the 
IAEA.
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6 Transport of radioactive and 
nuclear materials
Transport of nuclear material is subject to trans-
port licence as stipulated in the Nuclear Energy 
Act. These licencens are usually granted for a 
longer period and no new transport licences were 
granted in 2004. For each transport, there must 
be a transport plan approved by STUK. Also a 
physical protection plan and a certiﬁcate of nuclear 
liability insurance is required either separately or 
in connection with the transport plan. Before a 
package can be used for ﬁssile material transport, 
the package design must be approved by STUK. 
In 2004, fresh nuclear fuel was transported into 
Finland from Spain, Germany, Sweden and Russia. 
The western fuel was transported on trucks or 
trailers which are shipped by sea to a Finnish 
harbour and driven by road to the power plant. 
The Russian fuel was transported by rail over the 
border to Vainikkala, where it was loaded onto 
trucks and driven to Loviisa power plant. In 2004 
STUK approved six package designs by validation 
of a foreign certiﬁcate. Three transport plans for 
import or export of nuclear fuel were approved. In 
addition, three package designs were validated for 
transit shipments.
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7 Preventing illicit trafﬁcking
Import and export of radioactive and nuclear ma-
terial is subject to licence. STUK works in close 
cooperation with the Finnish Customs in order to 
prevent illegal import of radioactive and nuclear 
material into Finland. In 2004 there was no such 
case (Table VII). The co-operation is also extended 
to border ofﬁcers of neighbouring countries and 
STUK organised two training courses for Baltic 
border ofﬁcers in border control of radioactive ma-
terials.
Table VII. Number of shipments for which entry into 
Finland was denied due to undeclared radioactivity.
Year Number of denied shipments
1996 18
1997 23
1998 9
1999 7
2000 2
2001 0
2002 0
2003 0
2004 0
Figure 9. Automatic portal radiation monitor control-
ling cargo trafﬁc at the Port of Helsinki.
STUK will continue to participate in the in-
ternational work in preventing nuclear terrorism 
and illicit trafﬁcking of radioactive and nuclear 
material. In 2004 STUK participated in a meeting 
arranged by the ITWG (International Technical 
Working Group of Nuclear Smuggling) dealing 
with technical means to detect illicit trafﬁcking, 
organisational preparedness for operations in real 
case, exchange of information, etc.
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8 The Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international re-
gime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It 
bans totally any nuclear weapon test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constraining 
the development and qualitative improvement of 
nuclear weapons, including also the development of 
advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty 
will enter into force after it has been ratiﬁed by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament, and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors.
A global veriﬁcation regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The veriﬁcation regime consists of the following 
elements: International Monitoring System (IMS), 
consultation and clariﬁcation process, On-Site in-
spections (OSI) and conﬁdence-building measures.
Finland has signed and ratiﬁed the CTBT. In 
addition to complying with the basic requirement 
of the Treaty not to carry out any nuclear weap-
on tests, Finland takes part in the international 
monitoring network aimed at verifying more global 
compliance with the obligations of the Treaty.
In the CTBT framework, the National Authority 
is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK has two 
roles: STUK operates both the National Data 
Centre and the radionuclide laboratory. The main 
tasks of the National Data Centre are to monitor 
data received from the international monitoring 
system and to inform the National Authority about 
its monitoring results. The radionuclide laboratory 
serves the International Monitoring System by 
providing support in the radionuclide analyses and 
in the quality control of functions. Other national 
collaborators are the Institute of Seismology and 
the Ministry of Defence.
During 2004 the National Data Centre par-
ticipated in the meetings of the working group 
of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT 
Organization. The task of the working group is 
to deal with the examination and development of 
the veriﬁcation issues. The National Data Centre 
provided a training course for NDC managers 
from developing countries. The course was funded 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The National 
Data Centre continued developing its own routine 
monitoring system for the data received from the 
international veriﬁcation regime. During 2004 no 
anomalies were observed among the monitoring 
results.
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Figure 10. The network of 321 monitoring stations supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories, will be capable of  
detecting shock waves from a nuclear explosion underground, in the seas and in the air, as well as radioactive 
particles and noble gases released into the atmosphere.
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9 International safeguards 
cooperation
9.1 Hungary safeguards ﬁt for the EU
The PHARE project of the European Commission 
on safeguards was carried out between Hungary, 
Finland and Sweden. The major objective was 
to provide expert support and advice for the 
Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) who 
operates the Hungarian State System of Accounting 
and Control (SSAC) in the development of the coun-
try’s strategy for the accession. The project was suc-
cessfully completed by the end of November 2004.
STUK acted as the lead organisation for the 
project implementation. Experts of SKI contrib-
uted effectively to the project. The HAEA was of-
fered an opportunity hereby to appreciate a diverse 
set of information and experiences for its planning 
and decision making while preparing for the acces-
sion. All relevant areas of interest were addressed 
and questions relating to the legal system, opera-
tional experiences and practices as well as those 
relating to the R&D in the area of safeguards were 
responded to.
The project progressed in good atmosphere 
in accordance with the plan. The engagement of 
the Task Leaders and the efﬁcient work of the 
Beneﬁciary were ensuring success. In addition to 
the normal progress review meetings, a meeting in 
Luxembourg with the ofﬁcers of the Commission 
were held on 16.–17.9.2004. The aim was to ensure 
the visibility and understanding of the project and 
its outcomes as well as to reﬂect on issues of co-op-
eration in the implementation.
The ﬁnal meeting of the project was conducted 
in Budapest in the premises of the HAEA on 
4.–5.11.2004. The Project Manager Mr. Eduard 
Deksnis from the European Commission’s 
Enlargement Directorate-General was present and 
informed about the ﬁndings and ﬁnal results of the 
project. His experience, comments and guidance 
contributed to the quality of the Final Report.
As a result of this project and changes in 
the area of international safeguards the question 
about the sustainability of the work done appeared 
as an important one. It was understood that fur-
ther work will be required in the area of infrastruc-
ture, organization, resources and implementation 
processes. In order to precede the following ideas 
discussed brieﬂy and are hereby reproduced for 
information:
• HAEA and the Operators will, on the basis of 
the results and recommendations, make further 
efforts to enhance the infrastructure, net work 
of competences and functions of the national 
system, so as to be in a position to continue sup-
porting the further strengthening of the secu-
rity relevance of safeguards.
• This project brought together competencies in 
the Commission, Hungary, Sweden and Finland 
and developed the process that could be useful, 
as one of the resources, for the Commission in 
its efforts to ensure the adequacy of the safe-
guards in other EU member states.
Figure 11. Mr. A. Peto (HAEA) highlighting the major 
achievements to the Project Manager Mr. E. Deksnis 
from the Commission, in Budapest on 4.11.2004.
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• Further to the above, this experience and the 
resources could be seen as an asset in the con-
text of EU programs aimed at improving secu-
rity of nuclear and other radioactive materials 
in Russia, Ukraine and Bulgaria, for example.
• The Hungarian safeguards R&D programme, 
infrastructure and competences should be inte-
grated into the European research area.
9.2 Safeguards co-operation 
in the neighbour areas
The safeguards co-operation with the neighbour-
ing areas is motivated by the need for continu-
ing enhancement of the regional security environ-
ment. Accordingly Finland had a safeguards sup-
port programme for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
as well as continue its co-operation with Russian 
Federation in this area.
Because the Baltic States joined the European 
Union in 2004 the support programme that was 
funded by the Foreign Ministry was ﬁnished and 
collaboration continued within the framework of 
the Union programmes and institutions. In ad-
dition, STUK continue to maintain contact, as 
need arises, with the regulatory authorities of 
these States. The issues of interest cover such 
areas as maintenance and development of the 
national systems, including that responding to the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
nuclear material accountancy, physical protection 
and export/import control issues.
The resources of about 150 000 Euros made 
available by the Foreign Ministry were, during 
the year 2004, used within the Co-operation pro-
gramme with Russian Federation. The projects 
covered development of regulations and exchange 
of experiences in regulating and controlling the nu-
clear materials and other radioactive substances. 
Co-operation was extended to cover also a case 
where an inspector from STUK was present in 
person during an inspection of nuclear material 
carried by the Russian Authority. The aim of this 
exercise is enable the parties to improve their prac-
tices in implementation of the respective powers. 
The experiences of this exercise will be assessed 
in STUK during the current programme. Further 
to this the construction in Finland of a spent fuel 
measurement device (SFAT) for the demonstration 
purposes at Kola NPP was initiated. The purpose 
is to provide an in situ opportunity for the Russian 
operators and Authority to get acquainted with the 
project, technology and its application. Finally, a 
course was organized for the ofﬁcers of the Russian 
and Finnish customs. This was planned to be the 
ﬁrst one in the series of courses (about 8) extend-
ing over years with the aim over covering the 
border of the Russian Federation. Implementation 
of the projects is carried out by STUK in co-opera-
tion with the Finnish nuclear facilities and experts 
from other organizations like the State Research 
Centre.
9.3 Finnish support programme 
to the IAEA safeguards
In 2004 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs allocated 
200 000 Euros for the Finnish Safeguards Support 
Programme to the IAEA which was implemented 
under the coordination of STUK. Active partici-
pation of the Finnish nuclear facilities and other 
expert organisations in Finland is essential for the 
realization of the programme tasks. Major tasks re-
quire also cooperative efforts with the other IAEA 
Member States’ support programmes. The most 
remarkable support task in 2004 was the develop-
ment of a new IAEA training course concerning 
implementation of the Additional Protocol. Other 
support consisted of training of the IAEA inspec-
tors in using veriﬁcation instruments, development 
of safeguards measurement and analysis methods 
and support tasks related to the ﬁnal disposal of 
spent fuel.
Figure 12. First Complementary Access Course in Fin-
land in October 2004.
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9.4 Activities in ESARDA
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to all commit-
tees and most of the working groups (see Table VIII). 
In addition, STUK participated in ESARDA’s work-
ing groups, especially the Integrated Safeguards 
working group (IS WG). STUK contributed to the 
ESARDA’s symposium in Luxembourg with two 
presentations. STUK participated in the ESARDA 
Executive Committee meetings where a new 
ESARDA Agreement was negotiated.
9.5 Nordic Society
The Nordic Society, Seminar on Non-Proliferation 
Issues, was organised by STUK on October 5–6, 
2004 in Helsinki. The seminar covered most of 
the topical issues regarding non-proliferation of 
today. Director General of STUK, Professor Jukka 
Laaksonen opened the seminar. It was followed 
by a topical presentation by the IAEA and the 
Commission. Implementation and the ﬁrst steps to-
wards to implementation of the Additional Protocol 
in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Estonia as well 
as the further implementation work in Hungary 
and Lithuania were on the agenda. Political per-
spective for non-proliferation was presented by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland. Other in-
teresting topics were the co-operation with Russian 
Federation, physical protection and border control. 
The last but certainly not the least topic was the 
safeguards for ﬁnal disposal.
Table VIII. Finnish representatives in ESARDA organisa-
tion.
Body of ESARDA Member
Steering Committee Arja Tanninen
Executive Board Elina Martikka
Scientiﬁc Committee and Co-ordination 
Board
Tapani Honkamaa
Non-Destructive Assay Working Group Marko Hämäläinen
Containment and Surveillance Working 
Group
Tapani Honkamaa
Integrated Safeguards Working Group Olli Okko and  
Elina Martikka
Veriﬁcation Technologies Working 
Group
Juha Rautjärvi
Back end of Fuel Cycle Working Group Käthe Sarparanta, 
TVO
Figure 13. Käthe Sarparanta (TVO), Veli-Matti Ämmälä 
(Posiva) and Anna-Maija Kosonen (TVO) concentrating 
on the messages of the Nordic Seminar.
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10 Conclusions
All the actions including nuclear materials and 
other nuclear items were carried out according to 
the Finnish nuclear legislation and regulations. 
Also the requirements of the international agree-
ments have been fulﬁlled. The implementation of 
the Additional Protocol was started rapidly. Based 
on results of STUK’s regulation it is possible to 
conclude that the nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items were used for intended, peaceful, use.
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ANNEX 1 International agreements
A list of valid legislation, treaties and agreements 
concerning safeguards of nuclear materials at the 
end of 2004 in Finland (reference to Finnish Treaty 
Series, FTS)
1. Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 as 
amended.
2. Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 1988/161 
as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
• Regulation No 5, amendment of the list in 
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
• Regulation No 9, article 197, point 4 of the 
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 3227/76, 
19 October 1976 and Amendments:
• Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 
220/90, 26 January 1990 (a new inventory 
change code, MP)
• Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 
2130/93, 27 July 27 1993 (basic technical 
characteristics for newfacilities and report-
ing from Euratom to IAEA).
• Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 
302/2005, 28 February 2005 (New Safe-
guards Regulation; came into force on 
March 2005).
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 set-
ting up a Community regime for the control of 
Exports of dual-use items and technology as 
amended.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69).  Articles I, II, III 
and X have expired on 20 February 1999.
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10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Validity of the Agreement 
has been extended in 1999 and 2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70).
12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
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ANNEX 2 IAEA, Commission and STUK 
safeguards inspections in 2004
General Information Inspections Inspection Mandays
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
WL0V 8 Jan. Suplementary inspection 1 1 1 1
WL0V 26 Jan. FA inspection 1 1
W0LS 9–10 March Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 6
WL0V 12 March Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 20–21 May PIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L2 31 May – 1 June PIV 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
8–9 June Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 10 June Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LS 29 June – 1 July STUK GBUV 1 6
WRRF 23 Aug. PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 25–26 Aug. Loviisa 1 core veriﬁcation 1 1 1 2 2 2
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
7–10 Sep. STUK SFAT + W0LS PIV + 
routine inspection
3 3 4 3 3 10
WL0V 11 Sep. Loviisa 2 core veriﬁcation + 
PIV
1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 7 Oct. POST PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
29–30 Nov. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 2–3 Dec. Routine inspection 1 1 1 2 2 2
WL0V 14–16 Dec. STUK SFAT 1 4
TOTAL 22 21 26 26 25 47
Note: In Olkiluoto, inspections are counted per MBA. FA = Fuel Assembly, PIV = Physical Inventory Veriﬁcation
